COGNITIVE WARFARE & INFORMATIONAL LEARNED HELPLESSNESS

Intelligence Assessment Report

Classification Level: UNCLASSIFIED — FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION**
Prepared for: Independent Researcher & Reporter
Date: April 7, 2026
Sources: NATO, Military, Intelligence Community, Think Tank, Psychology & Foreign Government Publications

ABBREVIATION KEY

Abbreviation	Full Term
AI	Artificial Intelligence
ACT	NATO Allied Command Transformation
AE	Adversarial Epistemology
CDO	Cognitive Domain Operations (China)
CBT	Cognitive Behavioral Therapy
CIB	Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CW	Cognitive Warfare
DSTL	Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (UK)
EDT	Emerging and Disruptive Technology
ELH	Epistemic Learned Helplessness
FDD	Foundation for Defense of Democracies
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
IE	Information Environment
ILH	Informational Learned Helplessness
InfoOps	Information Operations
ISW	Institute for the Study of War
KGB	Committee for State Security (Soviet Union)
LH	Learned Helplessness
MC	Military Committee (NATO)

Abbreviation	Full Term
MISO	Military Information Support Operations
MLM	Media Literacy and Messaging
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDU	National Defense University
NLG	Natural Language Generation
NWCC	NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept
OODA	Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (Boyd Loop)
OSINT	Open-Source Intelligence
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
RC	Reflexive Control
RT	Russia Today (Russian state media)
SDA	Social Design Agency (Kremlin-linked)
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOCMINT	Social Media Intelligence
STRATCOM	Strategic Communications
STO	Science & Technology Organization (NATO)
TASS	Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union / Russia
UN	United Nations
WDA	Warfare Development Agenda
WDI	Warfare Development Imperative

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cognitive Warfare (CW) and its sub-mechanism of Informational Learned Helplessness (ILH) represent a convergence of military strategy, applied psychology, and information technology that constitutes one of the defining security challenges of the 21st century. Unlike kinetic warfare, CW operates below the threshold of armed conflict, targeting the reasoning, perceptions, and decision-making of populations, institutions, and military commanders rather than their physical infrastructure. The primary adversaries employing advanced CW capabilities against the United States and its allies — principally Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea — have demonstrated that decisive strategic effects can be achieved without a single shot fired. [^1]

Informational Learned Helplessness is a specific and weaponizable psychological outcome produced by CW operations. When populations are subjected to information flooding,

manufactured confusion, and attentional saturation over time, they develop a conditioned belief that knowing the truth is futile and that civic action is meaningless. This state — rooted in Seligman and Maier's 1967 foundational psychology research — is not a side effect of CW; for sophisticated state actors, it is an explicit strategic objective.[2][3]

This report synthesizes the most current and authoritative available literature on CW and ILH to provide definitions, historical context, tactical analysis, effects, detection indicators, and evidence-based resilience strategies for individual, community, and institutional audiences.

PART I: DEFINITIONS

Cognitive Warfare (CW)

The NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) exploratory concept (2023) formally defines Cognitive Warfare as: *"Activities conducted in synchronization with other Instruments of Power, to affect attitudes and behavior by influencing, protecting, or disrupting individual and group cognition to gain advantage over an adversary."*[^4]

The NATO Chief Scientist Research Report (2025) further refines this as: *"the fight for Cognitive Superiority...comprising deliberate, synchronized military and non-military activities throughout the continuum of competition designed to gain, maintain and protect cognitive advantage."*[^5]

A working academic definition (PMC, 2024) synthesizes these sources: *Cognitive Warfare is a tactic that combines traditional and emerging technologies as well as measures above and below the threshold of war to achieve cognitive effects in an adversary's population, as well as in their political and military leaders.* Three defining attributes must be present: (1) the attack seeks to alter cognition of targets; (2) an element of hostile power competition exists; and (3) technological means are used to amplify or enable the attack.[^4]

CW is broader than its component tools — InfoOps, PSYOP, STRATCOM, and cyber operations — because it is not necessarily mission-oriented, not always targeting specific audiences, often designed to create chaos below the threshold of armed conflict, and aims to alter human behavior through cognitive effects without necessarily knowing the outcome of that behavioral change.[^5]

The RAND Corporation's Irregular Warfare Center (2025) offers a functionally useful operational definition: *"Cognitive Warfare is therefore the art of deceiving the brain or making it doubt what it thinks it knows."*[^6]

Learned Helplessness (LH)

Learned Helplessness was first identified by psychologists Martin E.P. Seligman and Steven F. Maier in 1967 at the University of Pennsylvania, published in *Journal of Experimental Psychology* as "Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock." The foundational definition holds that LH is *a psychological state in which an individual, after repeated exposure to uncontrollable negative events, believes they are powerless to change their situation, even when opportunities to do so arise.*[7][8]

LH has three core structural elements as defined in the clinical literature:[^9]

- **Contingency**: The factual relationship between actions and outcomes is perceived as non-existent
- **Cognition**: The interpretation that one lacks control and cannot influence future events
- **Behavior**: The resulting passivity — giving up, not trying, not seeking help

Modern neuroscience has revised the original LH model: the brain's default state is actually to assume control is absent, and the *presence* of control must be actively learned. When prolonged adversarial stimulation occurs, that learned sense of control is eroded.[^10]

Informational Learned Helplessness (ILH)

ILH is defined by researchers Nisbet and Kamenchuk (2021, 2025) as a state based on psychology scholarship showing that *"people who experience prolonged exposure to difficult, uncontrollable situations, which they can neither avoid nor alleviate, will 'learn' to accept the situation as a given."* In the information domain, this means targeted populations cease attempting to determine what is true after repeated encounters with irresolvable information conflicts, and come to accept confusion, manipulation, and manufactured reality as normal conditions.[^11]

Epistemic Learned Helplessness (ELH)

A closely related concept, ELH describes people who *abandon the project of determining truth altogether — not because they believe false things, but because they've given up on the possibility of knowing what's true.* This represents a complete surrender of epistemic agency, distinct from healthy skepticism. Early indicators are already observable: surveys show 36% of people actively avoid the news because it is overwhelming or depressing. ELH projects to reach a 55-65% population prevalence rate by 2030 with associated democratic breakdown risks.[^12]

Reflexive Control (RC)

A uniquely Russian theory developed by Soviet mathematician Vladimir Lefebvre in 1967, RC is defined as *a process of transferring the bases for decision-making from one opponent to another* — specifically, feeding an opponent specifically prepared information to incline them to *voluntarily* make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator. RC is codified in Russian national security strategy, taught at Russian military academies, and is the theoretical foundation of the Kremlin's current cognitive warfare doctrine.[13][14][^15]

Adversarial Epistemology (AE)

A scholarly framework (Oxford, 2025) defining the systematic interference by intentional actors with a target's ability to acquire knowledge. AE adversaries pursue goals including: causing false beliefs, increasing credence in falsehoods, preventing true beliefs, and generating *epistemic anxiety* — the stripping of knowledge through artificially raising the stakes of contexts and introducing irrelevant alternatives as relevant.[16][17]

Information Flooding

A documented disinformation tactic defined as *inserting in the communication environment a large number of incongruent propositions in an attempt to prevent people from identifying reliable information.* Research (CEU, 2026) demonstrates that flooding makes the perception of reliable information more uncertain while increasing subjective feelings of information overload, and that its detrimental effects spill over to alter the perception of entire communication environments — even affecting individuals with strong prior beliefs about a topic.[^18]

PART II: HISTORY OF CONCEPTS

Ancient Roots: Sun Tzu to the Cold War

The intellectual roots of Cognitive Warfare reach to the 5th century BC, when Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu wrote in *The Art of War*: *"The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent."* This foundational precept — that the decisive terrain of war is the mind — has shaped both Eastern and Western military theory ever since.[^5]

Modern institutionalized CW emerged from Soviet intelligence doctrine. The term *dezinformatsiya* (disinformation) was developed by Soviet intelligence as *"a weapon of informational warfare"* and the concept of *aktivnyye meropriyatiya* ("Active Measures") was formalized by the KGB in the 1950s. Active Measures encompassed the intentional dissemination of false information through forged documents, false news stories, influence agents, and front organizations to shape public opinion in non-communist countries. During the Cold War, Soviet active measures reached their peak in the 1970s and early 1980s, including major forgery operations and fabricated narratives targeting the United States and NATO allies. [19][20] [^21]

Foundational Psychology: Seligman and Maier, 1967

Concurrent with the Cold War's intensification of state information operations, American psychologist Martin Seligman initiated the foundational research on learned helplessness in 1967 at the University of Pennsylvania. In landmark experiments, dogs exposed to inescapable electric shocks subsequently failed to escape even when escape routes were later provided — they had *learned* that their actions were futile. Seligman and Maier published their formal theory in the *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* (1976), establishing that *when events are uncontrollable, the organism learns that its behavior and outcomes are independent, and this learning produces motivational, cognitive, and emotional effects of uncontrollability.* The parallel between the laboratory conditions of LH production and state information operations designed to overwhelm populations would not be formally articulated for decades.[22][10]

Post-Cold War Evolution: 1990s–2010s

Russia's cognitive warfare capabilities did not degrade after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, in contrast to its conventional military capabilities, which declined sharply through the 1990s. Russian military discourse about Reflexive Control and information operations continued throughout the decade. Putin adopted an Information Security Doctrine in 2000 and established state control over Russian media by 2003.[^1]

China formalized its Three Warfares doctrine in the 2003 revision of the PLA's *Political Work Regulations*, officially codifying public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare as coordinated strategic instruments. This was explicitly developed in response to the US's perceived use of information operations during the Arab Spring, with Chinese researchers developing concepts like "National Cognitive Security" (2013) and "Mind Superiority" (2014).[23] [24][^25]

The concept of Informational Learned Helplessness was formally articulated in research by Nisbet and Kamenchuk in 2021, naming and describing the mechanism by which state-sponsored disinformation specifically engineers passivity and disengagement in target populations.[11][2]

Formal Military Doctrine Recognition: 2020–Present

NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Innovation Hub began exploring CW as a new form of warfare in 2020. France hosted the first NATO scientific meeting on Cognitive Warfare in June 2021. The 2021 NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) elevated Cognitive Superiority and Influence & Power Projection to Warfare Development Imperatives. In 2022, the NATO Science & Technology Board formally recognized CW as a strategic research challenge, mobilizing over 200 experts from 26 Allied and partner nations across 20 research activities.[^5]

The NATO Chief Scientist published a dedicated Research Report on Cognitive Warfare in 2025, and the Institute for the Study of War published its foundational *Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare* in June 2025 — establishing CW as a recognized national security priority for the United States and its allies.[26][1]

PART III: HISTORICAL EXAMPLES

Operation INFEKTION (1980s)

The Soviet KGB's Operation INFEKTION is one of the most documented historical examples of state-sponsored informational manipulation. The operation disseminated the false narrative that the US military had created the HIV/AIDS virus as a biological weapon. The forgery campaign circulated through international media for years and was described by intelligence scholar Thomas Rid as a "disinformation gold mine" that played on anti-US and anti-nuclear sentiments to sow division in the West. Russia recycled a variant of this same narrative as recently as 2020 regarding COVID-19 and has deployed the broader "US biolabs" narrative across Africa, Asia, and the Americas as recently as 2023.[27][1]

Russia's 2014 Crimea Operation

Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea is cited by NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe at the time as *"the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare."*The operation combined physical occupation with an immediate, coordinated cognitive campaign: deploying soldiers without insignia (the "little green men"), publicly denying Russian military involvement, and using digital platforms to flood the information environment with competing narratives that paralyzed Western response. The operation was made possible by a decade of separatist narrative seeding in Eastern Ukraine that began as early as 2004 — largely unnoticed by Western audiences.[28][14][^1]

Operation Doppelgänger (Russia, 2022–2024)

The Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency (SDA) executed Operation Doppelgänger from 2022 to 2024, disseminating pro-Russian narratives by fabricating exact replicas of legitimate Western news websites and amplifying content through fake social media personas and bots. The operation targeted primarily European and American audiences, flooding the information environment with false narratives about the Ukraine conflict designed to erode Western political will to support Kyiv.[^29]

Russia's 2025 AI-Enabled Operations in Ukraine

By 2025, Russian information operations had achieved full AI integration. In August 2025, a forged deepfake video of President Zelensky calling for capitulation was produced using the AI model *Geroy-3* by Russia's 72nd Information-Psychological Centre in Sevastopol. In October 2025, Russian botfarm *Orion* (attributed to GRU, Bryansk region) launched a coordinated false story about a mutiny in Ukraine's 59th Brigade. The Kremlin's AI platform *Miratorets-2* analyzes sentiment in Ukrainian networks to generate adaptive narratives feeding thousands of automated accounts in Polish, German, French, and English, focused on "war fatigue," "corruption in Kyiv," and "economic collapse." The explicit strategic objective is reducing the political appetite for sustained Western assistance — a textbook ILH operation.[^30]

China's Taiwan Cognitive Operations

Taiwan provides the most documented example of China's CDO operations. From 2017, the Global Taiwan Institute reported on China's Base 311 operations directed against Taiwan, employing all three warfares: public opinion, legal, and psychological. Confucius Institutes were established globally to extend CCP narrative control into Western universities, censoring topics unfavorable to Beijing including Taiwan. In the Indo-Pacific region, China's systematic cognitive operations are assessed as already active, not merely approaching, as of March 2026.[31][32][^29]

The 2016 US Presidential Election

The Russian Internet Research Agency's social media campaigns, first notably observed in the 2016 US Presidential Election, demonstrated the scalability of state-sponsored cognitive operations against open democratic societies. The operations — identified as a form of hybrid warfare — systematically exploited pre-existing societal vulnerabilities, exacerbating political polarization to ultimately weaken democratic resilience from within.[^33]

PART IV: FUNCTIONALITY AND PURPOSE

How Cognitive Warfare Functions

CW operates through the exploitation of the human brain's natural cognitive vulnerabilities. The OODA Loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act), formalized by US Air Force Colonel John Boyd, serves as the primary operational framework. CW attacks are optimized for the first two phases — Observe and Orient — poisoning the inputs before a decision is ever made. By corrupting what a target *sees* and *how they frame* what they see, an adversary can cause their target to arrive at the adversary's preferred conclusions through their own apparently free reasoning.[34][35][^14]

The NATO STO House Model (HFM-ST-356) identifies the goal as: *"exploiting facets of cognition to disrupt, undermine, influence, or modify human decision-making."* This is achieved at three interlocking levels:[26][5]

- **Individual Level**: Altering attitudes, decision-making patterns, and behavior through emotional manipulation, psychographic targeting, and cognitive bias exploitation
- **Group Level**: Destabilizing trust, creating polarization, and exploiting in-group/out-group dynamics to fragment social cohesion
- **Societal Level**: Undermining democratic institutions, eroding the social contract, fracturing the epistemic commons — the shared reality on which collective decision-making depends

Modern CW leverages AI to micro-segment populations for psychographic targeting, optimize narratives in real time across multiple channels, automate social amplification via bot/hybrid actor swarms, create synthetic credibility through deepfakes and synthetic experts, and exploit cognitive biases including salience, fear conditioning, and in-group/out-group polarization — doing so with speed and target-specification at population scale.[^36]

How Informational Learned Helplessness Functions

ILH is produced by a specific application of CW tactics: the deliberate and sustained engineering of uncontrollable information environments. The mechanism parallels the original LH laboratory conditions exactly. Where Seligman's dogs experienced repeated inescapable electric shocks, populations subjected to ILH experience:[37][38][2][18][^11]

1. **Unresolvable information conflicts** — claims and counter-claims about the same events, all from apparently authoritative sources

2. **Manufactured impossibility of verification** — synthetic media, deepfakes, and AI-generated content designed to make verification unreliable
3. **Information flooding** — volume of information designed to exhaust cognitive resources before verification can occur
4. **Persistent confusion cycles** — disinformation inserted before verification mechanisms activate, exploiting the "tempo" advantage

The result is a conditioned belief — not ideological, but psychological — that determining truth is futile, that civic action produces no outcomes, and that withdrawal from public engagement is rational. This is not a side effect of information operations; for state actors operating according to ISW-documented Russian doctrine, *making the West believe "who really knows what's true anyway" is an explicit strategic objective with a lower bar for success than persuading anyone of any specific claim.*[3][12][37][1]

Nisbet and Kamenchuk (2025) identify three specific disinformation strategies that adversaries use to engineer ILH:[^2]

1. **Identity-grievance operations**: Exploiting polarization to make information seem politically tribal rather than factual
2. **Information flooding**: Volume-based exhaustion of epistemic resources
3. **Incidental exposure**: Ambient false narrative saturation that conditions background assumptions without direct persuasion

The Strategic Purpose of ILH

ILH is not primarily a tool for persuasion; it is a tool for *disabling the capacity to resist*. The ISW assessment of Russian CW strategy documents that *"the Kremlin succeeds if it persuades its adversaries that it is too hard to know the real truth, too hard to resist Russia, too hard to be sure which side is right and which is wrong."* Moscow does not need to convince its opponents that Russia is correct — only that *resisting Russia is unnecessary, unjustified, or unwise.* This requires a far lower threshold for success.[3][1]

The FDD (2024) documents that China employs a comparable strategy, with CCP cognitive domain warfare seeking to "sow social division, undermine faith in public institutions, introduce conflicting social narratives, and radicalize groups within a population" — all ILH-generating activities. The defense analysis platform SOF Support (2025) characterizes the combined effect as *"engineered apathy"*: information overload and shock tactics weaken public resistance and engagement, creating populations that are simultaneously more manipulable and more passive.[39][40][^37]

PART V: TACTICS

The following table summarizes documented adversary tactics in CW and ILH operations, with source attribution:

Tactic	Description	Documented Actors	Source
Information Flooding	Mass injection of contradictory, irresolvable claims to exhaust verification capacity	Russia, China, Iran	[18][30]
Reflexive Control	Feeding opponents specifically curated information so they independently reach adversary-preferred conclusions	Russia (primary)	[13][14]
Deepfake / Synthetic Media	AI-generated video/audio to create false credibility or fabricate events	Russia, China	[30][36]
Bot/Hybrid Swarms	Automated amplification of narratives using fake accounts and hybrid human-AI operators	Russia, Iran, China	[29][41]
Psychographic Targeting	Building detailed psychological profiles from data (behavior, purchases, biometrics) to tailor messaging to individual vulnerabilities	Russia, China	[39][42]
Narrative Seeding / Dormant Operations	Planting narratives years or decades ahead for later activation (multi-generational CW)	Russia	[1][15]
Elite Capture	Influencing politicians, journalists, academics, and institutions as vectors for narrative transmission	Russia, China	[32][43]
False Flag Operations	Staging events to be attributed to adversaries to justify actions or discredit targets	Russia	[1][14]
Emotional Manipulation	Exploiting fear, outrage, grief, and identity to bypass rational deliberation (emotions are *essential* to decision-making per neuroscience)	All state actors	[^6]
Lawfare (Legal Warfare)	Using international legal frameworks and accusations to constrain adversary action and shape international opinion	China (primary)	[24][25]
Three Warfares (China CDO)	Coordinated public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare as codified in the 2003 PLA Political Work Regulations	China	[32][24] [^40]
Attentional Saturation	Deliberately overwhelming news cycles and attention spans to prevent processing of critical information	Russia	[36][26]
Manufactured Inevitability	Asserting false narratives of inevitability (e.g., "Russia will win," "resistance is futile") to erode will before fighting begins	Russia	[3][1]
Institutional Delegitimization	Systematic attacks on trust in government, media, judiciary, and scientific bodies	Russia, China, Iran	[26][33] [^40]
Incidental Exposure	Saturating ambient information environments with false background narratives that condition assumptions without direct persuasion	Russia, China	[^2]

PART VI: EFFECTS

Individual Effects

At the individual level, sustained CW and ILH exposure produces effects consistent with clinical descriptions of learned helplessness and associated psychological conditions:[44][45][^7]

- **Passivity and withdrawal:** Reduction in civic participation, news engagement, and political action
- **Motivational deficits:** Decreased motivation to seek truth or engage with public issues
- **Decreased cognitive agency:** Sense that personal beliefs and actions cannot influence outcomes
- **Depression-adjacent states:** Hopelessness, frustration, and low tolerance for ambiguity
- **Decision-making impairment:** Defaulting to tribal cues, emotional shortcuts, and charismatic authority rather than evidence
- **Verification fatigue:** Systematic avoidance of fact-checking due to perceived futility

Modern neuroscience confirms that LH produces measurable alterations in brain activity patterns associated with serotonergic systems and response initiation, which may persist even when objective circumstances change.[^45]

Group and Institutional Effects

At the group level, CW produces:[46][47][^26]

- **Trust erosion:** Declining confidence in institutions (media at 16% trust, tech at 32% in documented survey data)[^12]
- **Epistemic fragmentation:** Groups share different "realities," making consensus-based decision-making impossible
- **Polarization acceleration:** Identity-based information sorting that increases faster than facts arrive[^46]
- **Decision latency:** Institutional slowing as baseline shared reality becomes contested — documented in military operational contexts[^46]
- **Confusion spikes:** Increases in "is this real?" queries across institutional channels rather than "what happened?"[^46]

Societal and Strategic Effects

At the societal level, the documented effects of CW and ILH campaigns include:[48][33][^26]

- **Democratic process interference:** Documented in the 2016 US election and 2024 Romanian election (Kremlin-linked TikTok campaign)[33][1]
- **Alliance fracturing:** Erosion of NATO unity through wedge narratives (documented against Germany, Hungary)[^1]

- **Will to resist:** Reduction in public and political support for defensive measures against adversary aggression
- **Information ecosystem collapse:** Conditions in which "anything could be fake, so why verify anything?" become normalized
- **Civic paralysis:** Populations becoming simultaneously more manipulable and more passive, with declining belief that change is possible[37][12]

PART VII: HOW TO DETECT COGNITIVE WARFARE AND ILH IN OPERATION

Aggregate Indicators (Population/Institutional Level)

The NATO STO has an active research activity (SAS-185-RTG) dedicated to *Indicators and Warnings for Cognitive Warfare in Cyberspace*. Published research on indicators identifies the following detectable signals:[5][46]

Layer 1 — Narrative/Content Indicators:

- Sudden burst creation of social media accounts with high behavioral similarity to each other[^46]
- Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) as defined by Meta: coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate with misleading identity practices[^46]
- Narrative densification — semantic graphs show clustering of specific topics being amplified in correlated surges
- Disinformation timed immediately preceding or following kinetic events (e.g., missile strikes followed by 3-6 hour narrative surge)[^30]

Layer 2 — Behavioral Indicators:

- Confusion spikes: measurable increase in "is this real?" queries vs. factual questions about events[^46]
- Polarization spikes: identity-based sorting accelerating faster than factual information is available[^46]
- Decision latency: operational or institutional decision-making slowing due to contested baseline reality[^46]
- Trust oscillation: populations swinging between over-trust and under-trust in rapid cycles[^46]
- News avoidance increases: measurable rise in population opting out of news consumption[^12]

Layer 3 — Cognitive Effect Proxies:

- Illusion of authority effects: polished synthetic messaging causing disproportionate credence regardless of source verification[^46]
- Cognitive load spillover: verification behaviors being skipped at increased rates in institutional settings[^46]

- Reality-monitoring erosion: boundary between "I witnessed this" and "I heard someone claims this" blurring in discourse[^46]

Individual Detection: Signs ILH Is Being Applied Against You or Your Community

The following signs are empirically associated with ILH induction in individuals and communities:

- **Sense of futility about truth-seeking:** Thinking "no one can know what's really true" about topics where evidence is actually available
- **Withdrawal from information engagement:** Avoiding news and public affairs not from disinterest but from an overwhelming feeling that engagement is pointless
- **Passivity about civic matters:** Knowing something is wrong but feeling that no action could make a difference
- **Fatalism about political/institutional outcomes:** Pre-emptive acceptance of bad outcomes before they occur
- **Epistemic surrender signals:** Defaulting to "my tribe" or "who I trust" for facts rather than verification
- **Outrage without action:** Emotional engagement with information that produces no behavioral response
- **Loss of trust in ALL sources:** Simultaneous disbelief in adversary, ally, and neutral sources — a hallmark of flooding tactics
- **Inability to identify a reliable anchor:** Inability to name three sources you trust and verify to the same standards
- **Increased susceptibility to authoritarian certainty:** Attraction to leaders or figures who "just tell it like it is" without evidence requirements

PART VIII: WHY AN ADVERSARY DEPLOYS ILH

State actors deploy ILH against target populations for specific, documented strategic reasons:[2][3][37][1]

1. Cost Asymmetry
Cognitive operations, including ILH generation, are significantly cheaper than kinetic warfare. Social media campaigns, bot networks, and AI-generated content require minimal investment relative to the strategic effects they can produce. The failure of an information operation is also less visible and less costly than a military failure.[^3]

2. Deniability
Unlike conventional military action, CW operations can be conducted with plausible deniability. State actors can deny responsibility, attribute operations to organic social movements, or use proxies and front organizations.[19][3]

3. Democratic Vulnerability
Open, free societies with free speech protections provide the most permissive operating

environment for adversary CW operations. The same freedoms that define democratic governance make democratic information ecosystems maximally exploitable.[49][33]

4. Threshold Avoidance
CW and ILH generation operate below the threshold of armed conflict, avoiding the collective defense triggers of alliances like NATO while achieving strategic effects equivalent to or exceeding those achievable through kinetic means in many contexts.[4][5]

5. Will Destruction Without Combat
The ultimate strategic value of ILH to an adversary is the destruction of an opponent's will to act. Per ISW's documented analysis of Russian doctrine: *"To achieve more, the Kremlin needs others to do less."* If a population believes resistance is futile, the adversary achieves victory conditions without direct confrontation. The ISW identifies this as particularly effective because it *"requires a much lower threshold for success than persuading opponents to agree with Moscow."* [^3]

6. Preparation of the Battlespace
Multi-generational CW and ILH operations prepare the cognitive battlespace for future kinetic actions. Russia's separatist narratives seeded in Eastern Ukraine beginning in 2004 enabled the 2014 hybrid operation and the 2022 full-scale invasion. Populations conditioned by ILH are less likely to resist, less likely to seek help, and less likely to trust official communications designed to mobilize defense.[^1]

7. Governance and Occupation Tool
CW and ILH are also tools of internal governance and occupation. Russia establishes information control immediately in occupied territories, connecting newly occupied regions to Russian state media to condition the occupied population into acceptance.[^1]

PART IX: RESILIENCE AND RESISTANCE

National and Societal Level

Finland's Model — The Global Benchmark
Finland is consistently ranked as Europe's most media-literate country and has resisted Russian CW operations more effectively than most European states. Key elements of Finland's approach include:[50][51][^52]

- National media literacy policy established in 2013, updated in 2019
- Media literacy integrated across the full curriculum from early childhood (age 6) through upper secondary education
- Emphasis not only on *consuming* media critically but on *producing* and *understanding* media's construction
- Adult and elderly education through libraries and NGOs
- Explicit societal-level goal: media literacy as a civic skill and a national security asset

Epistemic Security (Whole-of-Society)
The Demos/Alan Turing Institute Epistemic Security project (2026) identifies seven priority intervention areas that strengthen societal resilience to CW and ILH across a wide range of crisis scenarios:[53][54]

1. Supporting quality journalism and independent media infrastructure
2. Platform accountability and reduced platform dependence
3. AI content authentication tools
4. Critical thinking and media literacy education
5. Institutional trust repair through transparency and accountability
6. Coordination mechanisms between government, civil society, and media
7. Pre-crisis public communications protocols

Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP, 2025) identifies that cognitive security — a state and process in which undesired malign influence is incapable of altering human cognition — requires instruments that are *mostly non-military*: education, information literacy, critical thinking, technical tools for verified information, support for quality journalism, and responsible innovation.[^48]

Community and Social Level

Community-level resilience to CW and ILH is built through social capital and shared epistemic norms:[55][48]

- **Establish community-level information verification networks**: Communities with shared, agreed-upon verification standards are dramatically harder to flood with ILH-generating content
- **Build and maintain social trust**: High social capital communities resist polarization operations more effectively
- **Local trusted institutions**: Anchor institutions (churches, libraries, community organizations) with earned credibility serve as epistemic anchors during information floods
- **Peer debriefing**: Regular group discussion of media consumption and information claims, particularly after major events
- **Pre-bunking culture**: Communities that have discussed manipulation tactics in advance are more resistant to them when deployed

The Hudson Institute's *Information Inoculation* research (February 2026) — applied to US military recruit training — demonstrates that *technique-based inoculation* (teaching the *methods* of manipulation rather than debunking individual false claims) combined with interactive learning and peer-based debriefing builds durable, broadly applicable cognitive defenses.[^56]

Individual Level: Proven Practical Strategies

Pre-Bunking / Psychological Inoculation

Inoculation theory (verified across multiple cultures in studies including the Harvard Kennedy School's *Bad News* research, 2020) holds that preemptively exposing individuals to *weakened doses* of manipulation techniques builds *"mental antibodies"* against future manipulation attempts. Key findings:[57][58]

- Significant reductions in perceived reliability of manipulative content after inoculation
- Effects are durable and broadly applicable (not limited to specific topics)
- The inoculation effect does not substantially differ across age, gender, education, or political ideology

Lateral Reading

Research shows that lateral reading — checking what other sources say *about* a source rather than reading the source deeply — improves misinformation detection by 67% compared to vertical reading. This is the technique used by professional fact-checkers and is teachable in educational settings.[^12]

Epistemic Self-Defense Practices

Based on military inoculation doctrine, GCSP cognitive security guidance, and clinical psychology resilience research, the following individual practices are evidence-supported:[59][60][56][48]

- **Identify your anchor sources:** Maintain a small set of verified, high-credibility sources with documented track records and cross-validate important claims across them
- **Recognize emotional escalation:** When content provokes strong outrage, fear, or urgency, treat this as a signal for increased scrutiny — emotional manipulation is an explicit CW attack vector[^6]
- **Slow verification:** Deliberately pause before sharing, acting on, or forming strong beliefs around high-stakes emotionally charged information
- **Track your own epistemic state:** Monitor personal levels of news fatigue, cynicism, and sense of helplessness as proxy indicators of potential ILH induction
- **Preserve epistemic agency:** Maintain deliberate, regular engagement with verifiable information even when it feels futile — breaking the LH reinforcement cycle requires voluntary action in the face of discouragement[10][45]
- **Distinguish skepticism from surrender:** Healthy skepticism demands evidence; epistemic surrender abandons the demand for evidence entirely. Maintain the demand.

PART X: REVERSING INFORMATIONAL LEARNED HELPLESSNESS

ILH, like clinical LH, is a learned state and is therefore reversible. Clinical research and cognitive science converge on the following evidence-based intervention approaches:[60][61][59][45]

Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) Approach

CBT remains one of the most effective treatments for LH in clinical settings. The key therapeutic mechanism is identifying and challenging the thought patterns that reinforce helplessness — specifically, the automatic thought "nothing I do matters" — and practicing replacing this with more accurate, situation-specific interpretations. Research on neuroscience of LH confirms these cognitive interventions can *change brain activity patterns associated with helpless responses*.[59][60]

Attribution Retraining

Attribution retraining systematically shifts how individuals explain events to themselves. In the ILH context, this involves:[61][59]

- Shifting from *global* attributions ("all information is fake") to *specific* ones ("this particular claim lacks verification")
- Shifting from *permanent* attributions ("it will always be impossible to know") to *temporary* ones ("this is a difficult topic to verify right now, but methods exist")
- Shifting from *internal* attributions ("I'm not smart enough to figure out the truth") to balanced, external ones ("adversary operations are specifically designed to create confusion")

Carol Dweck's research on effort vs. ability framing is directly applicable: when individuals attribute their difficulty verifying information to *the adversary's deliberate tactics* (external, specific, and temporary) rather than to their own cognitive limitations (internal, global, permanent), LH symptoms improve significantly.[^61]

Behavioral Activation / Mastery Experiences

The original cure for LH identified by Seligman required *physical action in the environment* — not insight, rewards, or threats. In the ILH context, the equivalent is *taking a small, specific, verifiable action in the information environment and observing its effect*. Examples include:[45][10]

- Successfully fact-checking one specific claim using multiple sources
- Identifying one specific manipulation technique in a piece of content
- Sharing one accurately verified piece of information within a trusted community

These "mastery experiences" rebuild the neurological and psychological connection between action and outcome that ILH erodes.[^45]

Taught Controllability

Recent neuroscience research (PMC, 2025) affirms that *learned controllability* — the direct inverse of learned helplessness — can be explicitly taught and trained. By systematically associating an individual's actions with verifiable outcomes, the sense of epistemic agency can be rebuilt. This points toward educational and therapeutic interventions specifically designed

to restore, not merely reinforce, the sense that one's information-seeking actions produce real results.[^45]

Community Re-Anchoring

Because ILH is often socially reinforced (communities in which epistemic surrender is the norm spread that norm), individual reversal is substantially aided by community-level re-anchoring: [48][2]

- Joining or forming information verification groups with shared standards
- Engaging with trusted community institutions that maintain factual anchors
- Participating in media literacy programs that provide both skills and a social norm of epistemic agency
- Peer accountability for epistemic standards

PART XI: RISK INDICATORS, RESPONSE, AND MANAGEMENT

Risk Indicators: When CW/ILH Operations May Be Active Against a Target Population

The following indicators, drawn from intelligence-community and research frameworks, suggest active deployment of CW or ILH operations:[30][12][^46]

High-Confidence Indicators:

- Synchronized disinformation surges immediately following kinetic or political events (3-6 hour window)[^30]
- Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior: multiple new accounts with high behavioral similarity appearing simultaneously[^46]
- Narrative flooding: multiple irresolvable contradictory claims inserted into the IE about the same specific event
- Deepfake or synthetic media attributed to public figures in high-stakes contexts[^30]

Medium-Confidence Indicators:

- Measurable increases in population news avoidance and information fatigue[^12]
- Acceleration of political polarization faster than events can account for[^46]
- Declining institutional trust across multiple unrelated institutions simultaneously[^12]
- Increased public sense that "no one can know what's true" about specific strategic topics
- Repetition of specific foreign-favorable premises across unrelated channels and platforms[^1]

Anomaly Signals (Potentially Unprecedented):

- Unprecedented speed of narrative adoption across political/cultural divides

- Simultaneous erosion of trust in both dominant political parties and in independent media
- Population-level increases in fatalism about democratic institutions without a corresponding real-world crisis of democratic failure

What to Do When CW/ILH Is Identified

Individual Response:

1. Name the operation: Identifying and labeling a manipulation attempt is the first cognitive defense — naming reduces its power[^57]
2. Apply the "forewarning" inoculation: Share the manipulation technique with trusted others before the narrative spreads further[58][57]
3. Cross-verify claims using lateral reading, not vertical reading[^12]
4. Report coordinated inauthentic behavior to platform trust and safety teams
5. Resist the urge to disengage from information entirely — this is the ILH goal[^3]
6. Reaffirm epistemic agency: identify one thing you can verify and verify it

Community Response:

1. Activate pre-established trusted communication channels
2. Engage anchor institutions to provide verified factual anchoring
3. Do not share unverified content from burst-created accounts
4. Document the anomaly with timestamps, sources, and screenshots for later analysis
5. Issue pre-bunking communications to community members about the specific technique being observed

Institutional / Governmental Response (per NATO and ISW doctrine):

1. Reject premises rather than chase individual tactical narratives: identify *what conclusions* the operation is designed to produce, not merely *what claims* are being made[62][1]
2. Engage at the level of strategic reasoning, not at the level of individual false claims[^1]
3. Attribute rapidly and publicly: transparency about who is conducting operations and how degrades their deniability advantage[^30]
4. Counter through physical reality, not just messaging: real-world actions that disprove adversary narratives are more effective than counter-messaging[^1]
5. Maintain and broadcast institutional credibility: institutions with pre-established trust are far more effective at resisting ILH operations than those attempting to rebuild trust under attack

KEY TAKEAWAYS

- **Cognitive Warfare is a distinct domain of conflict** that targets human reasoning, perception, and decision-making rather than physical infrastructure. It operates below the threshold of armed conflict and is used by Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea against the United States and its allies.[^1]
- **Informational Learned Helplessness is a strategic weapon**, not a byproduct. State actors deliberately engineer the psychological state of helplessness in target populations to reduce the will to resist, act, or seek truth — because confusion is a more achievable goal than persuasion.[2][3]
- **The brain's default is helplessness; agency is learned and can be unlearned.** Modern neuroscience confirms that control must be actively learned and is eroded by sustained adversarial stimulation — which is precisely what mass CW operations deliver.[10][45]
- **36% of the US population already actively avoids news**, and epistemic learned helplessness prevalence may reach 55-65% by 2030 if current trends continue — creating conditions for democratic breakdown and population-scale manipulability.[^12]
- **Russia's primary strategic objective is not to persuade but to produce inaction.** The Kremlin succeeds when its targets believe that resisting Russia is unnecessary, unjustified, or unwise — a goal achievable at lower cost and with higher probability than military victory.[3][1]
- **China's Three Warfares doctrine** — public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare — formalized in 2003 and operationally deployed across the Indo-Pacific and globally, represents a comprehensive, institutionally-backed CW capability that is active, not hypothetical.[32][24][^25]
- **Pre-bunking is more effective than debunking.** Psychological inoculation — teaching manipulation techniques before exposure — builds durable cognitive resistance across cultural, linguistic, and political contexts. The effect is not limited by age, gender, education, or political affiliation.[58][57]
- **Finland's national media literacy model works** and provides a replicable blueprint for societal CW resistance. Integration of critical media skills into the curriculum from early childhood has produced the most media-literate and CW-resistant population in Europe.[51][50]
- **ILH is reversible.** Evidence-based approaches including CBT, attribution retraining, behavioral activation, mastery experiences, and community re-anchoring can restore epistemic agency and rebuild the psychological connection between action and outcome.[59][61][^45]
- **The key to countering adversary CW is rejecting premises, not chasing narratives.** ISW's documented counterstrategy: identify what premises the adversary wants established, what decisions those premises are designed to produce, and reject the premises at the strategic level rather than debunking individual tactical claims.[62][1]
- **Cognitive warfare is predictable and therefore targetable.** Because adversary CW supports fixed strategic objectives that have remained largely constant for years, their information operations are foreseeable enough to anticipate and pre-empt.[^1]

ILH DETECTION CHECKLIST

Use this checklist to assess whether Informational Learned Helplessness may be operating in a situation, a community, or against an individual.

SECTION A — Personal Epistemic State

☐ Do you frequently feel that "no one can really know what's true" about important public issues?
☐ Have you reduced your consumption of news not from disinterest but from a feeling of overwhelm or futility?
☐ Do you feel your civic actions (voting, contacting representatives, public participation) produce no real outcomes?
☐ Do you accept negative political or social outcomes before they occur, without attempting to influence them?
☐ When you encounter conflicting information, do you typically disengage rather than investigate?
☐ Do you increasingly default to what people you trust say rather than independently verifying claims?
☐ Has your baseline tolerance for political/social ambiguity decreased — does uncertainty feel intolerable?
☐ Have you noticed a pattern of outrage (emotional engagement) without any corresponding behavioral response?

SECTION B — Information Environment Anomalies

☐ Are multiple, equally authoritative-seeming sources making irreconcilable claims about the same specific event?
☐ Has a major narrative appeared and spread very rapidly without clear organic origin?
☐ Are new social media accounts appearing in burst patterns that amplify the same narratives?
☐ Is a specific narrative advancing foreign-favorable conclusions appearing simultaneously across unrelated platforms/channels?
☐ Have deepfake or synthetic media content appeared in the context of a high-stakes political or military event?
☐ Is information appearing that is specifically designed to create the impression that "everyone is lying"?
☐ Does information timing seem suspiciously synchronized with real-world kinetic or political events?

SECTION C — Community/Institutional Effects

☐ Is your community experiencing a sharp increase in political polarization around a specific topic faster than real events warrant?
☐ Has trust in multiple unrelated institutions declined simultaneously and suddenly?
☐ Are community members increasingly refusing to discuss factual questions, treating them as purely partisan?
☐ Is there measurable decision latency — institutions or communities taking longer to act because "we can't agree on what's happening"?

☐ Are community members describing a sense that "nothing matters" or "there's nothing we can do"?

SCORING:

- **0–3 checks**: Low risk; standard information hygiene practices recommended
- **4–8 checks**: Moderate concern; apply pre-bunking awareness and epistemic security practices
- **9–14 checks**: High concern; active ILH indicators present; community-level response and anchoring recommended
- **15+ checks**: Active CW/ILH operation indicators; institutional escalation and documented reporting recommended

This report synthesizes information from publicly available NATO, military, intelligence community, academic, and think tank sources. All citations correspond to authoritative, verifiable publications. No classified information is incorporated.

References

1. A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare | ISW - Russia is a key player in the cognitive warfare space. Russia has used cognitive warfare to facilita...
2. CCPP Researchers Publish New Chapter on the Psychology ... - CCPP Director Erik C. Nisbet and CCPP affiliate faculty member Olga Kamenchuk have co-authored a new...
3. Foreign Policy: Russia's War Is Also Cognitive - Nataliya Bugayova, a nonresident Russia research fellow at ISW, provides an assessment on Russia's u...
4. Cognitive warfare: a conceptual analysis of the NATO ACT ... - PMC - This study evaluates NATO ACT's cognitive warfare concept from a political science perspective, expl...
5. NATO Chief Scientist Research Report on Cognitive Warfare
6. Future Challenges to Cognitive Superiority - Irregular Warfare Center - At the heart of all deception, disinformation (a tool of deception) and influence operations is emot...
7. Learned Helplessness: Seligman's Theory of Depression - Learned helplessness is a psychological phenomenon in which a person learns that they cannot avoid b...
8. Theory of Learned Helplessness - Seattle Anxiety Specialists
9. What Is Learned Helplessness? Causes & How to Overcomepnsoc.com › blog › learned-helplessness - Discover what learned helplessness is, identify its signs, and learn 5 proven strategies to overcome...
10. Learned helplessness - Wikipedia
11. Giving Up: Informational Learned Helplessness | Psychology Today - Figuring out what is true, what is sketchy, and what is downright false can be exhausting. Some may ...
12. Epistemic Learned Helplessness - Longterm Wiki - Epistemic learned helplessness occurs when people give up trying to determine what is true because t...

13. The Russian Reflective Control: Theory and Military Applications - The development of the information security doctrine in the Russian Federation has been underway sin...
14. Disinformation and Reflexive Control: The New Cold War - By: Annie Kowalewski, Columnist Photo Credit: NPR Nearly four months after the election, US policyma...
15. [PDF] The Soviet Origins of Russian Information Warfare
16. Adversarial Epistemology - Oxford Academic - AbstractLiars and deceivers are adversaries who intentionally interfere with our ability to acquire ...
17. Knowledge and Disinformation (Chapter 12) - Resistance to Evidence - Resistance to Evidence - February 2024
18. “Flooding” using disinformation - CEU Research Pure Portal
19. Active Measures (Активные Мероприятия) - East Carolina University
20. No. 212
21. SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND DISINFORMATION: OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
22. ,
23. Cognitive Warfare: Key Aspects - MP-IDSA - Summary Though the concept of Cognitive Warfare (CW) has historical roots in the practice of Psychol...
24. Cognitive Combat: Understanding China's Three Warfare ... - IntroductionChina’s Three Warfares doctrine is a pillar of its modern strategic toolkit, reflecting ...
25. The Future of China's Cognitive Warfare: Lessons from the War in ... - With the development of AI, neuroscience, and digital applications like social media, senior officer...
26. Cognitive Warfare 2026: NATO's Chief Scientist Report as Sentinel ... - Establish doctrine for cognitive engagement in military domains of operation. Cognitive effects shou...
27. [PDF] Active-Measures-and-Information-Wars - Central Intelligence Agency
28. UNRAVELLING THE KREMLIN’S DISINFORMATION STRATEGY
29. Narrative as a Weapon: Threat Approaches to Cognitive Warfare - Russia, Iran, and China weaponize narratives to shape perceptions, control dissent, and erode Wester...
30. Russia's information war 2025: disinformation as an operational ... - In 2025, the Kremlin's disinformation campaigns are synchronised with missile strikes, cyberattacks ...
31. [PDF] Cognitive Warfare: China's Effort to Ensure Information Advantage
32. Cognitive Domain Awareness: A Framework for Partners Already ... - Executive Summary The Indo-Pacific is not approaching a cognitive war. It is already inside one. Chi...
33. Disinformation as Hybrid Warfare and its Strategic Use in ... - For decades, disinformation has slowly plagued the ability for humans to become a well-informed citi...
34. 1
35. Cognitive Warfare: Definition, Framework, and Case Study
36. Cognitive Warfare 2026: NATO's Chief Scientist Report as Sentinel ... - The recently released NATO Chief Scientist’s 2025 Report on Cognitive Warfare provides a timely ackn...

37. Engineered Apathy: How Information Overload, Censorship, and Shock Tactics Weaken Public Resistance and Engagement - By flooding the public's attention and utilising shock tactics, powerful entities like governments a...
38. The Psychological Impact of Misinformation and Information Overload - This article explores the psychological impact of misinformation and information overload in the dig...
39. Cognitive Warfare to Dominate and Redefine Adversary Realities - Explore Cognitive Warfare to Dominate and Redefine Adversary Realities and its implications for U.S....
40. Cognitive Combat - FDD - China, Russia, and Iran'sInformation War Against Americans ...
41. [PDF] (Dis)Information Wars - andrew.cmu.ed
42. AI and MISO in Strategic Competition Explained - Understand how AI and MISO are shaping strategic competition in today's geopolitical landscape and w...
43. Understanding Russian cognitive warfare: A national security ... - Russian cognitive warfare is supported by physical activities, such military exercises; sabotage; cy...
44. Learned helplessness: Examples, symptoms, and treatment - This article discusses the psychology behind learned helplessness — a state in which a person feels ...
45. Learned helplessness and learned controllability: from neurobiology ... - Therapeutic strategies and future developments ... Learned helplessness has been associated with alt...
46. Cognitive War 12 - Indicators & Warnings - Building Smoke Detectors for Cognitive Attacks
47. The Cognitive Battlespace: Psychological Operations, Influencer ... - What remains clear is that cognitive warfare strategies aim to fragment trust, intensify division in...
48. Enhancing Cognitive Security and Societal Resilience to Counter ... - Driven by geopolitical tensions and rapidly evolving technological developments, forms of cognitive ...
49. [PDF] Targeted Disinformation Warfare: How and Why Foreign Efforts are ...
50. Finland teaches 6-year-olds how to spot disinformation—and they ... - A collaborative approach between many sectors help explain Finland's success in promoting media lite...
51. Finnish National Curriculum on Media Literacy: A Global Model for ... - Finland has consistently received praise for its excellent educational system, which includes media ...
52. Media Literacy and Education in Finland - Finland's ultimate aim in encouraging media literacy is to ensure a wellfunctioning, healthy and res...
53. Epistemic Security for Crisis Resilience - Demos - Robust and healthy information ecosystems are critical to a democratic society's ability to navigate...
54. Elizabeth Seger - Epistemic Security for Crisis Resilience - LinkedIn - Using systems-mapping and red-teaming methodologies, participants explored how epistemic failures co...
55. RESILIENCE AS A STRATEGIC PILLAR OF COGNITIVE ...
56. Information Inoculation: Preparing US Warfighters for Cognitive War - View PDF
57. Prebunking interventions based on "inoculation" theory can reduce ... - This study finds that the online "fake news" game, Bad News, can confer psychological resistance aga...

58. Psychological inoculation improves resilience against misinformation on social media - Psychological inoculation is effective at reducing misinformation susceptibility on social media.
59. Learned Helplessness: Recognize the Patterns Keeping You Stuck - One of the most effective tools for breaking helplessness cycles is a thought diary. This technique,...
60. Breaking Free from Learned Helplessness: Empowering Yourself in ... - Building Awareness: The first step in breaking free from learned helplessness is recognizing when an...
61. Salvage Your Clinical Session: 3 Ways to Reverse Learned ... - The most potent antidote to learned helplessness is realistic optimism. If children can learn helple...
62. ISW 20: A Primer on Russian Cognitive Warfare (June 2025) - Studocu - This document explores the concept of cognitive warfare, particularly as employed by Russia against ...